Molecular detection and characterization of highly pathogenic H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b avian influenza viruses among hunter-harvested wild birds provides evidence for three independent introductions into Alaska.

We detected and characterized highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses among hunter-harvested wild waterfowl inhabiting western Alaska during September-October 2022 using a molecular sequencing pipeline applied to RNA extracts derived directly from original swab samples. Genomic characterization of 10 H5 clade 2.3.4.4b avian influenza viruses detected with high confidence provided evidence for three independent viral introductions into Alaska. Our results highlight the utility and some potential limits of applying molecular processing approaches directly to RNA extracts from original swab samples for viral research and monitoring.

Rapid evolution of A(H5N1) influenza viruses after intercontinental spread to North America.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b underwent an explosive geographic expansion in 2021 among wild birds and domestic poultry across Asia, Europe, and Africa. By the end of 2021, 2.3.4.4b viruses were detected in North America, signifying further intercontinental spread. Here we show that the western movement of clade 2.3.4.4b was quickly followed by reassortment with viruses circulating in wild birds in North America, resulting in the acquisition of different combinations of ribonucleoprotein genes. These reassortant A(H5N1) viruses are genotypically and phenotypically diverse, with many causing severe disease with dramatic neurologic involvement in mammals. The proclivity of the current A(H5N1) 2.3.4.4b virus lineage to reassort and target the central nervous system warrants concerted planning to combat the spread and evolution of the virus within the continent and to mitigate the impact of a potential influenza pandemic that could originate from similar A(H5N1) reassortants.

SARS-CoV-2 exposure in wild white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus).

Widespread human SARS-CoV-2 infections combined with human-wildlife interactions create the potential for reverse zoonosis from humans to wildlife. We targeted white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus) for serosurveillance based on evidence these deer have angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 receptors with high affinity for SARS-CoV-2, are permissive to infection, exhibit sustained viral shedding, can transmit to conspecifics, exhibit social behavior, and can be abundant near urban centers. We evaluated 624 prepandemic and postpandemic serum samples from wild deer from four US states for SARS-CoV-2 exposure. Antibodies were detected in 152 samples (40%) from 2021 using a surrogate virus neutralization test. A subset of samples tested with a SARS-CoV-2 virus neutralization test showed high concordance between tests. These data suggest white-tailed deer in the populations assessed have been exposed to SARS-CoV-2.

Agricultural and geographic factors shaped the North American 2015 highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N2 outbreak.

The 2014-2015 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5NX outbreak represents the largest and most expensive HPAI outbreak in the United States to date. Despite extensive traditional and molecular epidemiological studies, factors associated with the spread of HPAI among midwestern poultry premises remain unclear. To better understand the dynamics of this outbreak, 182 full genome HPAI H5N2 sequences isolated from commercial layer chicken and turkey production premises were analyzed using evolutionary models able to accommodate epidemiological and geographic information. Epidemiological compartmental models embedded in a phylogenetic framework provided evidence that poultry type acted as a barrier to the transmission of virus among midwestern poultry farms. Furthermore, after initial introduction, the propagation of HPAI cases was self-sustainable within the commercial poultry industries. Discrete trait diffusion models indicated that within state viral transitions occurred more frequently than inter-state transitions. Distance and sample size were very strongly supported as associated with viral transition between county groups (Bayes Factor > 30.0). Together these findings indicate that the different types of midwestern poultry industries were not a single homogenous population, but rather, the outbreak was shaped by poultry industries and geographic factors.

Evidence for wild waterfowl origin of H7N3 influenza A virus detected in captive-reared New Jersey pheasants.

In August 2014, a low-pathogenic H7N3 influenza A virus was isolated from pheasants at a New Jersey gamebird farm and hunting preserve. In this study, we use phylogenetic analyses and calculations of genetic similarity to gain inference into the genetic ancestry of this virus and to identify potential routes of transmission. Results of maximum-likelihood (ML) and maximum-clade-credibility (MCC) phylogenetic analyses provide evidence that A/pheasant/New Jersey/26996-2/2014 (H7N3) had closely related H7 hemagglutinin (HA) and N3 neuraminidase (NA) gene segments as compared to influenza A viruses circulating among wild waterfowl in the central and eastern USA. The estimated time of the most recent common ancestry (TMRCA) between the pheasant virus and those most closely related from wild waterfowl was early 2013 for both the H7 HA and N3 NA gene segments. None of the viruses from waterfowl identified as being most closely related to A/pheasant/New Jersey/26996-2/2014 at the HA and NA gene segments in ML and MCC phylogenetic analyses shared ≥99 % nucleotide sequence identity for internal gene segment sequences. This result indicates that specific viral strains identified in this study as being closely related to the HA and NA gene segments of A/pheasant/New Jersey/26996-2/2014 were not the direct predecessors of the etiological agent identified during the New Jersey outbreak. However, the recent common ancestry of the H7 and N3 gene segments of waterfowl-origin viruses and the virus isolated from pheasants suggests that viral diversity maintained in wild waterfowl likely played an important role in the emergence of A/pheasant/New Jersey/26996-2/2014.

Novel Highly Pathogenic Avian A(H5N2) and A(H5N8) Influenza Viruses of Clade 2.3.4.4 from North America Have Limited Capacity for Replication and Transmission in Mammals.

Highly pathogenic influenza A(H5N8) viruses from clade 2.3.4.4 were introduced to North America by migratory birds in the fall of 2014. Reassortment of A(H5N8) viruses with avian viruses of North American lineage resulted in the generation of novel A(H5N2) viruses with novel genotypes. Through sequencing of recent avian influenza viruses, we identified PB1 and NP gene segments very similar to those in the viruses isolated from North American waterfowl prior to the introduction of A(H5N8) to North America, highlighting these bird species in the origin of reassortant A(H5N2) viruses. While they were highly virulent and transmissible in poultry, we found A(H5N2) viruses to be low pathogenic in mice and ferrets, and replication was limited in both hosts compared with those of recent highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses. Molecular characterization of the hemagglutinin protein from A(H5N2) viruses showed that the receptor binding preference, cleavage, and pH of activation were highly adapted for replication in avian species and similar to those of other 2.3.4.4 viruses. In addition, North American and Eurasian clade 2.3.4.4 H5NX viruses replicated to significantly lower titers in differentiated normal human bronchial epithelial cells than did seasonal human A(H1N1) and highly pathogenic A(H5N1) viruses isolated from a human case. Thus, despite their having a high impact on poultry, our findings suggest that the recently emerging North American A(H5N2) viruses are not expected to pose a substantial threat to humans and other mammals without further reassortment and/or adaptation and that reassortment with North American viruses has not had a major impact on viral phenotype. IMPORTANCE Highly pathogenic H5 influenza viruses have been introduced into North America from Asia, causing extensive morbidity and mortality in domestic poultry. The introduced viruses have reassorted with North American avian influenza viruses, generating viral genotypes not seen on other continents. The experiments and analyses presented here were designed to assess the impact of this genetic diversification on viral phenotypes, particularly as regards mammalian hosts, by comparing the North American viruses with their Eurasian precursor viruses.

Outbreak of H7N8 Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Commercial Turkeys with Spontaneous Mutation to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) subtype H7N8 was detected in commercial turkeys in January 2016. Control zone surveillance discovered a progenitor low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus in surrounding turkey flocks. Data analysis supports a single LPAI virus introduction followed by spontaneous mutation to HPAI on a single premises.

Antibody titer has positive predictive value for vaccine protection against challenge with natural antigenic-drift variants of H5N1 high-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses from Indonesia.

UNLABELLED: Vaccines are used in integrated control strategies to protect poultry against H5N1 high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI). H5N1 HPAI was first reported in Indonesia in 2003, and vaccination was initiated in 2004, but reports of vaccine failures began to emerge in mid-2005. This study investigated the role of Indonesian licensed vaccines, specific vaccine seed strains, and emerging variant field viruses as causes of vaccine failures. Eleven of 14 licensed vaccines contained the manufacturer's listed vaccine seed strains, but 3 vaccines contained a seed strain different from that listed on the label. Vaccines containing A/turkey/Wisconsin/1968 (WI/68), A/chicken/Mexico/28159-232/1994 (Mex/94), and A/turkey/England/N28/1973 seed strains had high serological potency in chickens (geometric mean hemagglutination inhibition [HI] titers, ≥ 1:169), but vaccines containing strain A/chicken/Guangdong/1/1996 generated by reverse genetics (rg; rgGD/96), A/chicken/Legok/2003 (Legok/03), A/chicken/Vietnam/C57/2004 generated by rg (rgVN/04), or A/chicken/Legok/2003 generated by rg (rgLegok/03) had lower serological potency (geometric mean HI titers, ≤ 1:95). In challenge studies, chickens immunized with any of the H5 avian influenza vaccines were protected against A/chicken/West Java/SMI-HAMD/2006 (SMI-HAMD/06) and were partially protected against A/chicken/Papua/TA5/2006 (Papua/06) but were not protected against A/chicken/West Java/PWT-WIJ/2006 (PWT/06). Experimental inactivated vaccines made with PWT/06 HPAI virus or rg-generated PWT/06 low-pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) virus seed strains protected chickens from lethal challenge, as did a combination of a commercially available live fowl poxvirus vaccine expressing the H5 influenza virus gene and inactivated Legok/03 vaccine. These studies indicate that antigenic variants did emerge in Indonesia following widespread H5 avian influenza vaccine usage, and efficacious inactivated vaccines can be developed using antigenic variant wild-type viruses or rg-generated LPAI virus seed strains containing the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes of wild-type viruses. IMPORTANCE: H5N1 high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) virus has become endemic in Indonesian poultry, and such poultry are the source of virus for birds and mammals, including humans. Vaccination has become a part of the poultry control strategy, but vaccine failures have occurred in the field. This study identified possible causes of vaccine failure, which included the use of an unlicensed virus seed strain and induction of low levels of protective antibody because of an insufficient quantity of vaccine antigen. However, the most important cause of vaccine failure was the appearance of drift variant field viruses that partially or completely overcame commercial vaccine-induced immunity. Furthermore, experimental vaccines using inactivated wild-type virus or reverse genetics-generated vaccines containing the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes of wild-type drift variant field viruses were protective. These studies indicate the need for surveillance to identify drift variant viruses in the field and update licensed vaccines when such variants appear.